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STUDENT NOTES AND RECENT CASES
MUNICIPAL

CORPORATIONS-CITY

OFFICIALS-OTHER

EM-

PLOYMENT.-The charter of the city of Fairmont, after vest-

ing all corporate powers in directors, provided that no appointive officers of the city shall become the employee -of
the city in any other capacity, except by consent of the Directors shown by resolution. (Charter, City of Fairmont,
Sec. 23, 29, 30). By resolution, the Directors appointed
the chief of police as jailor and the city engineer as chief
mechanic at the city pumping station. Held, that an appointive official may also become an employee of the city and
receive compensation for such employment in addition to
his official salary. State v. Amos, 140 S. E. 544 (W. Va. 1927).
There is no doubt, upon a careful reading of the case,
that what the City is attempting to do is to raise the salaries
of the appointive officials by giving them other employment
which one might suspect was included in the work to be
done by them under their appointive offices. What the
court is doing is permitting the salaries to be raised by virtue of something which, on its face, clearly appears a subterfuge. Nevertheless, there is nQ fault to find with the
case, for the Board of Directors clearly acted within the
limits of the city charter. The court is here interpreting
an old and burdensome statute in such a way as to meet
changed conditions. Presumably at the time that the legislature placed the maximum salaries to be paid city officials,
they were sufficient. But, with a change of economic conditions, the individual is no longer willing to permit prestige to be more predominant than the pecuniary worth to
be yielded from public offices. Various forms of commercial enterprise are attracting persons of ability, so that political organizations are being saturated with the incompetent. If governmental agencies are to secure persons of
competency, it is imperative that adequate salaries be supplied and paid. If the legislature fails in its duty, the
courts should, when functioning within its constitutional
limitations, attempt to harmonize the social and economic
conditions with the rules laid down by the legislature. This
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is a privilege in which courts often indulge, and where the
equity and justice are obvious, as in this case, no exception
should be taken. The discretion given to the Board of Directors by the legislature provided the very lobp hole
through which it was possible to meet the exigencies of a
changed society, and thus to permit the government in this
instance to function.
-MosE

EDWIN BOIARSKY.

REAL PROPERTY-DEEDS-DELIVERY TO GRANTEE ON CONDITION.-It is disconcerting to the ordinary man unlearned in

law to discover that a transaction which seems to him natural
and reasonable has been construed by the courts into something quite different from what he had intended. Such is
the case where one executed a deed to land and gives it
to his grantee with the understanding that it is to take
effect only upon the happening oi some condition. The
courts to his astonishment refuse to recognize his intention,
but attribute an utterly foreign meaning to his act, a meaning drawn from an old and technical rule of the common
law the reason for which, if any ever existed, has long since
vanished. He finds little consolation for his unjust treatment in being informed that it is the law that though he
intended a conditional delivery, his act nevertheless amounts
to an absolute delivery. A good example of such an injustice based on this ancient legal formula is found in the
case of Rouss v. Rouss. 1 Defendant, in that case, a devisee
under her husband's will of a life estate on condition that
she did not remarry, persuaded plaintiff-who was remainderman in fee following said widow's life estate under
the will, contingent upon his paying six $2,000 legacies to
nephews and a niece of testator on termination of said life
estate-to execute a quitclaim deed of a life estate in her
favor free from the condition as to remarriage. She secured
the deed upon her promise not to use it until she should
1 90 W. Va. 646. 111 S. E. 586 (1922).
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